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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the establishment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1945, 
the enforcement of international criminal law has largely occurred at the supranational 
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level.  Groups of states have come together either through interstate agreements after war,1 
through Chapter VII action by the UN Security Council,2 or through international treaty-
making3 to grant jurisdiction over international crimes to various international tribunals.  
More recently, the enforcement of international criminal law has migrated to the domestic 
level, first through the exercise of universal jurisdiction and subsequently through the 
establishment of semi-internationalized criminal courts, effectively grafted on to domestic 
judiciaries, such as the Special Panels in East Timor4 or the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone.5  As I have argued elsewhere, these developments have led to the emergence of a 
system of international criminal law enforcement operating at a variety of different levels.6  
Within this system, domestic courts are on the front lines of enforcement, with 
supranational courts such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) stepping in under the 
regime of complementarity7 when domestic courts are unable or unwilling to act. 
To date, a core level of this system—the regional level—remains unexplored and 
underdeveloped.  There has yet to be any systematic study of either the normative 
implications of enforcing international criminal law at the regional level or of the possible 
means for regionalization of international criminal justice.  The lack of attention paid to 
regional opportunities for enforcing international criminal law is surprising in light of the 
trend toward new regionalism in the study of international relations and the growing 
number of regional regimes enforcing other substantive areas of international law.  This 
article seeks to fill this void, providing a preliminary consideration of whether 
regionalization of international criminal justice would be a useful development and how 
regionalization can be achieved. 
National and supranational enforcement each offer various benefits and drawbacks 
that are in inherent tension.  Regional enforcement of international law, however, would be 
situated at a unique midpoint between the national state and the international system.  
Regionalization could, therefore, provide a hitherto unavailable means of balancing the 
benefits and dangers of both supranational and national enforcement.  In terms of cost, 
legitimacy, political independence, and judicial reconstruction, regionalization may be a 
normatively preferable means of enforcing international criminal law.  To that extent, 
regionalization merits attention as a viable part of a system of international criminal law 
enforcement. 
The potential normative benefits of regionalization are relatively easy to achieve 
within the already existing structure of international criminal law.  From a neo-functionalist 
political science perspective, regional enforcement of international criminal law offers 
states political advantages, while decreasing the sovereignty costs of membership in 
                                                                                                                                                    
1. See, e.g., Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280. 
2. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (creating the 
ICTY pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter). 
3. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
4. See On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offenses, United 
Nations Transnational Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) Reg. 2000/15, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 
(June 6, 2000). 
5. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, U.N. SCOR,  57th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2002/246, appended to Letter 
Dated 6 March 2002 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, app. II (2002) 
[hereinafter Sierra Leone Agreement]. 
6. See generally William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International 
Criminal Justice, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002) (arguing that international criminal law will be enforced at the 
domestic level in the future). 
7. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17 (establishing the complementarity regime). 
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international criminal law enforcement bodies.8  States may therefore be more willing to 
enter into and deepen their relationships with regional, rather than supranational, 
enforcement mechanisms.  While regionalization could come in many forms, including the 
creation of new regional criminal courts, a variety of softer options for regionalization 
within existing mechanisms of international criminal law are already available.  For 
example, pursuant to the Rome Statute, the ICC can sit regionally.  Likewise, a preference 
could be given to regional courts exercising universal jurisdiction, or semi-internationalized 
courts could draw heavily on judges and procedures from within their own region.  Any or 
all of these three pathways to regionalism could be followed with relatively little cost or 
need for major change to existing institutional arrangements. 
Part II of this article sets a background for the possibilities of regional international 
criminal law enforcement by exploring regionalization of other substantive areas of 
international law enforcement.  Part III argues that regionalization of international criminal 
law could be a normatively positive development as it might better balance the benefits and 
drawbacks of national and supranational enforcement.  Part IV applies political science and 
international relations methods, particularly from a neo-functionalist perspective, to 
develop a theory of regionalization of international criminal law, arguing that states are 
highly likely to support regionalization.  Part V explores various pathways to 
regionalization including the creation of regional criminal courts as well as a variety of 
softer forms of regionalism.  Part VI considers two possible impacts of regionalization on 
substantive international law and suggests the likely development of procedural 
differentiation within a universal system. 
This article should not be interpreted as a call for a strong form of regionalization 
through the creation of regional criminal courts along the lines of the ICC.  Rather, it is 
intended to open a debate about alternate means of enforcement of international criminal 
law.  Given that the ICC Statute has already come into force and attracted significant 
support, the creation of regional criminal courts may be an unnecessary duplication.  
Nonetheless, this presentation of the strong argument for regional enforcement highlights 
the importance of possibilities for softer forms of regionalization within already existent 
enforcement mechanisms.  The article is thus best read as a call for greater consideration of 
regional criminal justice and an argument that a softer form of regionalism, primarily 
though existing mechanisms, is relatively easy to achieve and could offer powerful 
normative benefits. 
II. THE TREND TOWARD REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Outside of the arena of international criminal law, regional mechanisms have become 
the enforcement means of choice for many international legal regimes.  From piracy to 
environmental pollution, from money laundering to human rights, regional regimes are 
more frequently proving to be effective means of enforcement.  A brief overview of this 
trend to regional enforcement in other areas highlights the potential effectiveness of 
regional enforcement generally and the possibilities for regional international criminal law 
enforcement. 
The area of international law enforcement in which regional organizations have been 
most active for the longest period of time is in the maintenance of international peace and 
security.  This role for regional organizations, of course, derives from Article 52 of the UN 
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Charter, according to which, “[n]othing in the present Charter precludes the existence of 
regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance 
of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action . . . .”9  Regional 
organizations have been extremely active in creating and maintaining international legal 
rules to preserve international peace and security.10  Examples range from the Organization 
of American States in the Cuban Missile Crisis11 and the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia12 to NATO in Kosovo.13 
Money laundering provides a second example of a contemporary international legal 
regime which seeks regional solutions to transnational problems.  Regional organizations 
have been particularly active in developing new mechanisms for prevention and 
punishment.  The 1991 Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of 
Assets was created under the auspices of the Council of Europe.14  The Organization of 
American States, acting through the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission 
announced recommendations for regionally based solutions in 1997.15  Commentators have 
argued that “strengthening of the emerging international money movement enforcement 
regime” depends on implementation at the “universal [and] regional . . . levels.”16 
Closer to the realm of international criminal law, regional solutions have been 
suggested for the prohibition and punishment of piracy on the high seas, often considered 
the genesis of universal jurisdiction in international criminal law.  Sea piracy has suffered 
from “an international legal regime that lacks an effective enforcement mechanism.”17  
Noting the differences among “regionally-based piracy ‘clusters,’” various commentators 
have called for “a regional approach to combat modern piracy.”18  They observe that the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea “appears to invite a regional, ‘Piracy 
Charter’ enforcement approach to piracy,” which would include the establishment of “a 
regional enforcement mechanism to suppress piracy.”19 
In a variety of other substantive areas, the enforcement of international law has been 
strengthened through regional mechanisms.  International fisheries law, for example, 
“provides for enforcement to be carried out by regional organizations and arrangements.”20  
                                                                                                                                                    
9. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1. 
10. See generally Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmány, A Redistribution of Authority Between the UN and Regional 
Organizations in the Field of the Maintenance of Peace and Security?, 13 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 297 (2000). 
11. See, e.g., Michael Akehurst, Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies, with Special Reference to the 
Organization of American States, 42 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 175, 197–213 (1967). 
12. See, e.g., Matthew S. Barton, ECOWAS and West African Security: The New Regionalism, 4 DEPAUL 
INT’L L.J. 79, 94–100 (2000); Timothy M. Shaw, The Revival of Regionalism in Africa: Cure for Crisis or 
Prescription for Conflict?, 11 JERUSALEM J. INT’L REL. 79 (1989). 
13. See, e.g., Tarcisio Gazzini, NATO Coercive Military Activities in the Yugoslav Crisis (1992–1999), 12 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 391 (2001); Deen-Racsmány, supra note 10, at 298 (observing that NATO strikes in Kosovo were 
one of the most controversial enforcement measures carried out by a regional organization since the end of the 
Cold War). 
14. Bruce Zagaris, Trends in International Money Laundering from a U.S. Perspective, 35 INT’L LAW. 839, 
841 (2001). 
15. Id. at 863. 
16. Id. 
17. Timothy H. Goodman, Note, Leaving the Corsair’s Name to Other Times: How to Enforce the Law of 
Sea Piracy in the 21st Century Through Regional International Agreements, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 139, 141 
(1999). 
18. Id. at 154–55; see also Samuel P. Menefee, The New “Jamaica Discipline”: Problems with Piracy, 
Maritime Terrorism and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 127, 149–50 (1990) 
(discussing the possibility of regional responses to piracy within the context of the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention). 
19. Goodman, supra note 17, at 159. 
20. Christopher C. Joyner, Compliance and Enforcement in International Fisheries Law, 21 TEMP. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 271, 294 (1998). 
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Pursuant to the Straddling Stocks Agreement, regional organizations may authorize the 
inspection and sanction of vessels, irrespective of whether the flag state is a member of the 
organization.21  Similarly, regional enforcement of media and intellectual piracy law has 
proved effective.  For example, copyright infringements in the Caribbean Basin Area have 
been significantly reduced through the Caribbean Basin Initiative, where “trade benefits 
and economic assistance [to the region] were conditioned on copyright protection.”22  
Based on this success, commentators have called for further regional efforts to combat 
intellectual piracy.23  Enforcement of international environmental law has also been 
migrating to the regional level.  In the 1980s and 1990s alone the European Commission 
“has brought more than fifty cases to the ECJ [European Court of Justice] involving the 
failure of a member State to comply with environmental regulations.”24 
Each of these examples in which regional enforcement of international law has been 
utilized or proposed share two important elements.  First, the international legal problem in 
question is either regional in nature or poses a particular regional concern.  Second, for 
reasons ranging from geographic proximity to cross-border politics, regional organizations 
are more effectively positioned and/or politically able to enforce the legal rules in question 
than are supranational entities.  In many respects, the enforcement of international criminal 
law shares these elements.  First, while international crimes are of concern to the entire 
international community, the peace and security implications of such crimes are often 
greatest within the region where the crimes occur.  The United States’ and Europe’s failure 
to intervene in Rwanda but willingness to do so in Kosovo is indicative thereof.  Second, as 
will be explored further in Part III below, regional mechanisms are uniquely positioned to 
enforce international criminal law.  It may well be, therefore, wise to apply Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 advice to the area of international criminal law: “[I]n this 
new era of opportunity, regional arrangements or agencies can render great service . . . .  
[R]egional arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be 
utilized in . . . preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-
building.”25  The next Part explores this normative appeal of regionalization. 
III. THE NORMATIVE APPEAL OF REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 
In the emerging system of international criminal justice,26 enforcement of 
international law has had two primary focal points.  At the supranational level, states have 
delegated authority, often through the United Nations to international tribunals such as the 
ICC, to prosecute international crimes.  At the national level, the international community 
has delegated authority to national courts to enforce international criminal law directly, 
either through the exercise of universal jurisdiction or the creation of specialized 
international courts within the domestic judiciary of post-conflict states. 
                                                                                                                                                    
21. See id. at 295. 
22. Linda W. Tai, Music Piracy in the Pacific Rim: Applying a Regional Approach Towards the Enforcement 
Problem of International Conventions, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 159, 180–81 (1995). 
23. Id. at 184–87. 
24. Peggy Rodgers Kalas, International Environmental Dispute Resolution and the Need for Access by Non-
State Entities, 12 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 191, 209 (2001). 
25. Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Preliminary List Item 10, 
para. 63–64, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S24111 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 953 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda for 
Peace]. 
26. See generally Burke-White, supra note 6. 
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Both supranational and national approaches to the enforcement of international 
criminal law have been much criticized, often properly so.  Supranational tribunals are 
often unwieldy, expensive, and both physically and psychologically distant from the 
particular crimes in question.  National courts, while less expensive to administer and 
closer to the events in question, often lack judicial resources and run the risk of bias.  
Unfortunately, the costs and benefits of supranational and national enforcement are in 
direct tension with one another.  As the benefits of supranational adjudication are realized, 
those of domestic adjudication are lost.  Because regional enforcement is situated at a mid-
point between the supranational and domestic levels of authority, regional mechanisms are 
uniquely positioned to strike a balance between these costs and benefits. 
This Section explores the normative appeal of a regional approach to international 
criminal justice.  The first two factors—proximity to the site of the crimes and the 
potentially lower costs of prosecution—seem to support an argument for national 
prosecutions.  The second two factors—the potential for greater judicial experience and the 
reduced likelihood of political manipulation—suggest that supranational prosecution would 
be preferable.  A regional approach to international criminal law enforcement can balance 
these factors, offering a tribunal situated relatively close to the affected communities and 
comparatively less expensive than international tribunals.  Likewise, regional courts could 
have greater judicial resources and less political bias than national courts.  Thus, regional 
adjudicatory mechanisms could offer an ideal compromise between national and 
supranational adjudication. 
A. Physical Proximity to the Alleged Crimes 
One of the chief drawbacks of supranational adjudication of international criminal law 
is the physical distance of the court from the events in question.  The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has been much criticized for its lack of 
connection to the national context of the cases it adjudicates.27  ICTY staff, for example, 
have only had “occasional contacts and exchanges” in the affected region, rather than the 
kind of local engagement which would “make the work of the tribunal relevant to the 
national justice systems in the region.”28  Such concerns are likely to expand with the 
operation of the ICC when cases from countries geographically removed, such as those in 
Southern Africa or Latin America, are adjudicated in The Hague. 
The physical distance of supranational courts from the site of the alleged crimes has 
troubling consequences in two respects: judicial reconstruction and restorative justice.  
From the perspective of judicial reconstruction, a core goal of international criminal justice 
should be to “catalyze future prosecutions” domestically by restoring the rule of law and 
the efficacy of national judicial institutions.29  Yet, supranational tribunals, because of their 
physical distance and judicial separation from the domestic context, have failed “to assist in 
preparing the local prosecutors and courts to carry out investigations and trials” and have 
only marginally contributed to judicial reconstruction.30 
                                                                                                                                                    
27. See David Tolbert, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen 
Successes and Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7, 12 (2002) (observing that the ICTY 
suffered from a “strategic failure in that [it] has not had much impact on the development of courts and justice 
systems in the region”). 
28. Id. at 14. 
29. Note, The Promises of International Prosecution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1957, 1974 (2001).  Not all accept 
judicial reconstruction as a goal of international criminal justice, leaving that to international development 
programs.  However, if reconstruction is a goal of prosecution, the proximity factor is crucial.  See generally, José 
Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 365 (1999). 
30. Tolbert, supra note 27, at 12. 
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Regional courts may offer significantly greater opportunities for judicial 
reconstruction than do supranational institutions such as the ICTY.31  While semi-
internationalized courts grafted onto the national judicial system based on the Sierra Leone 
or East Timor model32 are most likely to directly engage and thus enhance the national 
judicial systems in question, the relative proximity of regional courts would allow far 
greater engagement and training for national judiciaries than do supranational tribunals.  
Regional courts would presumably draw on prosecutors, judges, and staff from the region, 
thereby providing training and experience for those likely to return to domestic judicial 
systems.  Particularly if regional courts were given a specific mandate of engaging with and 
training national courts, they could offer a powerful tool for post-conflict reconstruction. 
Second, the physical separation of supranational enforcement mechanisms from the 
communities in which the crimes occurred has led to a failure of restorative justice.  
Restorative justice seeks, in the words of Desmond Tutu, “not so much to punish as to 
redress or restore a balance that has been knocked askew.  The justice we hope for is 
restorative of the dignity of the people.”33  The goals of restorative justice are “(1) to affirm 
and restore the dignity of those whose human rights have been violated; (2) to hold 
perpetrators accountable . . . ; and (3) to create social conditions in which human rights will 
be respected.”34 
Achieving the goals of restorative justice requires a close connection between the 
adjudicating court and the society affected by international crimes.  With thousands of 
miles and trans-oceanic flights separating witnesses and evidence from the court in The 
Hague, the ability of the ICC to perform a restorative justice function is limited.  To 
provide a concrete example, the first case of rape as a crime against humanity in 
international law—the Kunarac case before the ICTY35—had an enormous cathartic 
potential to restore the people of Foca, the town in southern Bosnia in which the events 
occurred.  Yet, even as thirty-eight women detained in rape-camps told their stories to the 
ICTY, the people of Foca were isolated from the events of the trial and largely unable to 
personally benefit from the proceedings.36  Despite improvements in technology and 
dissemination, many areas where international crimes occur remain technologically 
isolated.  Moreover, personal physical presence is often thought crucial to the restorative 
justice process. 
A regional approach to international criminal law enforcement presents much greater 
opportunities for affected communities to benefit from legal proceedings against 
international criminals.  First, regional courts are likely to be physically more proximate to 
the events in question, thus reducing the cost and time involved in giving affected 
communities access to proceedings.  If, for example, a court adjudicating crimes in Chile 
                                                                                                                                                    
31. Both the ICTY and ICTR already reflect some aspects of regional justice—being situated at some 
distance from the site of the crime and having a regionally or nationally restricted jurisdiction.  Yet, both of these 
courts are still conceived of within the framework of supranational courts and fail to incorporate many of the 
aspects of regionalization discussed herein. 
32. See Burke-White, supra note 6, at 61–75. 
33. Tina Rosenberg, A Reporter at Large: Recovering from Apartheid, NEW YORKER, Nov. 18, 1996, at 90.  
As Martha Minow summarizes, “Restorative justice emphasizes the humanity of both offenders and victims.  It 
seeks repair of social connections and peace rather than retribution against the offenders.”  MARTHA MINOW, 
BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 92 (1999). 
34. Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on Restorative 
Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE 68, 79 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 1999). 
35. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (I.C.T.Y. Feb. 22, 2001). 
 
36. The author served in ICTY Trial Chamber II during the Foca case and observed this testimony first hand.  
While some of the testimony was available through closed-circuit television in the region, few of the residents of 
Foca were able to participate directly in or bear witness to the case. 
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were located in Argentina, rather than in say The Hague, the likelihood of witnesses, 
victims, and ordinary citizens attending the trial or being familiar with the proceedings, is 
greatly enhanced.  While even the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
located in Arusha, Tanzania, has been criticized for its distance from the crimes in 
Rwanda,37 bringing witnesses or victims to the ICTR has been facilitated by the relative 
proximity of Arusha to Kigali.  Moreover, efforts by the ICTR and NGOs to bring the 
proceedings in Arusha home to Rwanda have been expedited by this proximity.38  For 
example, radio documentaries and traveling plays that recreate the trial in local 
communities would have been significantly harder to implement if the trials themselves 
were geographically farther away than Arusha.39  The relative proximity of Arusha also 
made possible a proposal by then Prosecutor Louise Arbour to hold “periodic sessions in 
Kigali.”40  The trial of the Lockerbie bombing suspects at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands, in 
many ways similar to a regional model of criminal justice, had a highly effective victims’ 
assistance unit largely funded by the U.S. government, which ensured that the families of 
Scottish, American and other victims could attend the trial.41 
While regional courts will never be as effective at assisting to reconstruct domestic 
judiciaries or facilitating the processes of restorative justice as semi-internationalized 
domestic courts, regional mechanisms are likely to be far more effective at these goals than 
are supranational tribunals.  If judicial reconstruction and restorative justice are part of the 
core mission of international criminal justice, than regional approaches ought to be 
considered as viable alternatives to supranational prosecution. 
B. Legitimacy of the Tribunal 
Regional enforcement mechanisms are also far more likely to exhibit a second, and 
possibly more significant, form of proximity—namely the psychological proximity and 
sense of connection between the tribunal and the local community, upon which legitimacy 
depends.  Supranational enforcement mechanisms risk being seen as “an instrument of 
hegemony for powerful states.”42  When a tribunal is perceived as a foreign agent, imposing 
its will on a national system, it quickly loses credibility.  An August 2000 survey in 
Croatia, for example, found a high percentage of Croatians believed that The Hague is 
biased, while fifty-two percent “believed that ‘The Hague wants to criminalize the 
Homeland War.’”43  Not surprisingly seventy-eight percent felt that Croatia should not 
“extradite its citizens if the Hague Tribunal requests it.”44  For a national government to be 
                                                                                                                                                    
37. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future 
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 14 (2001).  “The ICTR has often been faulted for its remoteness from the 
Rwandese people.  Its geographical location . . . makes it visibly distant.”  Id. at 25.  Of course, regional criminal 
justice would not completely solve this problem of physical distance—Tanzania and Rwanda are, after all 
neighbors.  It might, however, ameliorate some of the challenges presented by any physical distance whatsoever.  
And, in some cases, purely local prosecutions may still be preferable. 
38. See id. at 25.  “[The ICTR] has tried increasingly to inform the public about its activities through the 
Rwandese media.”  Id. 
39. See, e.g., Kate Gehring, Independent Media and Justice in Rwanda: Rwandans Laud Film on Genocide 
Trials, Want to See More, INTERNEWS, March 28, 2001, at  http://www.internews.org/activities/ICTR_reports/ 
ICTR_genocidefilm_03_01.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2003). 
40. See Akhavan, supra note 37, at 25. 
41. Norman McFadyn, Lecture at the Lauterpacht Center for International Law at the University of 
Cambridge (Nov. 22, 2002). 
42. See Akhavan, supra note 37, at 30. 
43. Id. at 22 (citing Survey Shows ‘Anti-Hague Atmosphere’ Increasing In Croatia, FBIS Doc. 
EUP20000823000244 (Aug. 19, 2000) (trans. of JUTARNJI LIST (Zagreb), at 31)). 
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politically able to cooperate with an international criminal tribunal, the tribunal must be 
perceived as legitimate by the affected national polity. 
Regional criminal law enforcement mechanisms are far more likely to be perceived as 
legitimate in affected communities than are their supranational counterparts.  As José 
Alvarez observes, “[i]f Rwandan society shares comparable notions of judicial legitimacy, 
it stands to reason that having judges who come from the local community may itself be 
determinative of the legitimacy of these processes.”45  He also states: “[T]hose who seek 
primacy for international processes are preferring certain [externally imposed] 
goals . . . over the desires of many of those who have been most immediately affected by 
genocide.”46  In many ways, the perceived legitimacy of the tribunal turns on the 
connection of the proceedings to those most affected by the crimes being adjudicated.  As 
applied to international law enforcement, Jonathan Charney has observed that this greater 
sense of legitimacy leads states to “be more comfortable with a tribunal whose members are 
chosen from the region in which the dispute arose.”47  A regional court would presumably 
have a greater concentration of prosecutors, staff, and judges from the local community, 
thereby augmenting the perceived domestic legitimacy of the tribunal. 
Part of this notion of greater legitimacy of a regional tribunal derives from the claim 
that regional groupings share some sense of common identity.48  Many regionalists have 
argued “members of a common region also share cultural . . . linguistic, or political ties.”49  
Taken to an extreme, such shared cultural values were inherent in the original conception of 
the Organization of African Unity, which “envisioned an amalgamation of African states 
into a continental body based on equal sovereignty of all states.”50  Where regional 
groupings do share a common set of values or identities, regionalization allows those 
values to be better reflected in adjudicative tribunals.  Shared values within a particular 
region, again to borrow from Charney, have led states to create regional “international 
dispute settlement forums [because] the composition of the tribunal may be important to the 
disputants for reasons of expertise or cultural factors.”51 
A final way in which regional courts may garner greater legitimacy within affected 
communities than their supranational counterparts stems from the greater opportunities for 
public debate and deliberation offered by the regional approach.  Martha Minow has noted 
the “value of the process of public deliberation in creating legitimacy for the 
undertaking.”52  A regional court, with fewer member states, may be perceived as more 
responsive to local customs, values, and preferences.  In that sense regionalization may 
contribute to the democratization of international law.  As Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali 
has observed, regional action can “contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus 
and democratization in international affairs.”53  If Boutros-Ghali is right, regional criminal 
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law enforcement mechanisms may generate a greater “buy-in” among affected communities 
more directly represented in a regional court. 
C. Reduced Financial Costs of Regional Enforcement 
Regional enforcement of international criminal justice also offers the prospect of 
significantly reduced costs as compared to supranational or global enforcement 
mechanisms.  The monetary costs of international criminal law enforcement have been and 
will continue to be a significant hindrance to the effective operation of international 
tribunals.  As Pierre Prosper, the U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues testified 
to the U.S. House International Relations Committee, “the process [of international justice] 
at times has been costly, [and] lacked efficiency.”54  Even judges at the ICTY and ICTR 
have been quick to criticize the high costs of such tribunals.  Patricia Wald, the former U.S. 
judge at the ICTY has observed that the “United Nations is understandably anxious to bring 
to closure the ICTY and the tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which together consume almost 
ten percent of the total UN budget.”55 
Regional courts could significantly reduce the financial burden of international 
criminal law enforcement for a number of reasons.  First, regional courts by definition 
would have a limited territorial jurisdiction.  As such, they could specialize, focusing their 
attention on a particular region and not expending limited resources attempting to 
investigate and prosecute crimes committed elsewhere.  Second, a regional criminal court 
could pay staff salaries calculated to reflect costs of living within the region, thus reducing 
what is usually a court’s largest single cost.  While regional salaries might not cause 
considerable savings in Europe, the impact on an African court could be substantial.  For 
example, most professional-level UN employees at the ICTY are in the P-3 or P-4 bracket, 
earning in the U.S.$60-80,000 range.56  While a regional court might need to pay some 
salaries in this range to attract some necessary international staff, the bulk of salaries could 
be far lower in regional courts.57  Third, particularly where linguistic patterns correspond to 
a court’s jurisdiction, significant savings could be attained by minimizing the working 
languages of the court.58  Fourth, the collection and production of evidence in regional 
courts would be significantly reduced, through lower travel costs, ease of scheduling, and 
potentially greater cooperation with national authorities.  A variety of similar efficiencies of 
scale and focus may be available at the regional level. 
The lower costs of regional criminal justice become particularly apparent when 
comparing international tribunals such as the ICTY and ICTR with semi-internationalized 
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courts such as those in operation in Sierra Leone and East Timor.  The estimated 
appropriation for the ICTY for 2002–2003 is just over U.S.$256 million59 and in the past 
eight years, the U.N. Security Council “has paid some $1.6 billion . . . to operate 
International Criminal Tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda.”60  In comparison, the 2001 
budget of the semi-internationalized courts in East Timor (which hear only cases of crimes 
committed in East Timor in 1999) was merely U.S.$6.3 million, with approximately U.S.$6 
million spent on prosecution and U.S.$300,000 dedicated to the operation of the court 
itself.61  Similarly, the budget of the semi-internationalized court in Sierra Leone62 is 
approximately U.S.$56 million (less than one-fifth that of the ICTY).63  Admittedly, the 
significant variation in budgets also reflects a variation in the quality of justice rendered.  
The Special Panels in East Timor have numerous flaws and resource constraints.64  But they 
are nevertheless dispensing reasonably fair and competent international justice.  Obviously, 
regional courts are likely to cost more to operate than the semi-internationalized courts in 
East Timor.  The striking differences in cost between a supranational enforcement 
mechanism such as the ICTY and semi-international courts such as those in Dili and 
Freetown are, nevertheless, strong evidence of the financial savings which may be offered 
by regional international criminal law enforcement.  Such savings could easily translate into 
greater political willingness of states to enforce international criminal law, as the oft-stated 
fears of unchecked expenses are allayed. 
D. Availability of Sufficient Judicial Resources in Regional Enforcement Mechanisms 
Admittedly, the need for proximity between the adjudicating court and the affected 
community as well as the lower costs of national tribunals suggest that purely domestic 
trials might be the ideal means of enforcement.  Yet, these factors, must be counterbalanced 
by two other considerations that argue in favor of supranational prosecution: the 
availability of judicial resources and the likelihood of political manipulation.  Regional 
tribunals, however, are uniquely able to offer many of the benefits which characterize 
international courts, without sacrificing the aforementioned strengths of local prosecutions. 
One of the primary criticisms of using national judicial mechanisms for the trial of 
international crimes is that national courts—usually in post-conflict situations—lack 
sufficient judicial resources to effectively adjudicate international crimes.  For example, 
after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, over 120,000 suspects were incarcerated.  Given the 
extremely limited number of judges and lawyers, at that time “it [was] estimated it would 
take anywhere between two to four centuries to try all those in detention.”65  In addition to 
the overwhelming numbers of cases, the Rwandan judiciary has faced significant resource 
and personnel shortages. 
Resource constraints such as those in Rwanda plague many national attempts at 
international justice.  In East Timor, for example, Judge Maria Gusmao Pereira, the leading 
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East Timorese Judge on the Special Panels adjudicating international crimes, had no 
training in international law and had never served as a judge before her appointment by the 
United Nations Transitional Authority.66  Despite Judge Maria’s education at a law faculty 
in Bali, under Indonesian rule she was not permitted to practice law.  In East Timor, the 
limited judicial experience in international and criminal law is significantly exacerbated by 
the lack of available support resources.  There are no judicial clerks or assistants, as is 
common in most jurisdictions.67  There is likewise no judicial library (though a few legal 
books have recently been collected).68  Until December 2001, judges did not have personal 
internet access, making any research almost impossible.69  Similar resource constraints have 
affected the office of the public defender.  For most of 2001, six public defenders had to 
cover all cases in East Timor—both regular cases and those before the Special Panels.70  
Inadequate resources and personnel limitations in the office of the public defender have 
meant that one defender is often assigned to multiple defendants in the same trial, creating 
unacceptable conflicts of interest.71 
Regional courts could solve many of the resource constraints facing national 
prosecution of international crimes for three primary reasons.  First, regional courts could 
draw on the judicial experience of an entire region, increasing the likelihood that judges 
have both courtroom experience and international law training.  A regional court in Africa, 
for example, could draw on South African, Ghanaian, Nigerian, or Ethiopian jurists as well 
as those from countries with less developed judiciaries such as Rwanda or the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.  Second, regional courts could pool resources from across an entire 
region.  Thus, if a pencil shortage hampers the administration of justice in Rwanda, other 
countries in the region could provide the necessary facilities, technology, and resources to 
ensure relatively effective operation of the courts.  A regional court would thus facilitate 
the subsidization of justice by richer countries in the region for the benefit of states 
emerging from violent conflict.72  Third, a regional court can maximize the efficiency of the 
administration of international criminal justice.  Thankfully, few states—with the exception 
of post-conflict situations, such as Rwanda or Sierra Leone—have an abundance of 
international crimes to investigate and prosecute.  Thus, through regionalization, the 
administrative and judicial costs of setting up and operating a court with the capabilities to 
prosecute international crimes can be distributed over a larger body of cases.  Whereas 
vesting a court with the jurisdictional authority and judicial resources to prosecute a single 
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international crime may be prohibitively expensive, the creation of a regional court by a 
number of states to hear cases of crimes arising in an entire region would more effectively 
utilize legislative, judicial, and financial resources. 
E. Reduced Likelihood of Political Manipulation in Regional Enforcement Mechanisms 
While some of the normative arguments presented above would favor enforcement of 
international criminal law at the national level, national courts are frequently subject to 
political manipulation, particularly in the transitional societies where international criminal 
law is most frequently enforced.  Political manipulation, or the capture of the judicial 
process by particular factions within a national government, can prevent the creation of an 
international court or undermine its effectiveness and legitimacy.  Regional courts, because 
of their relative separation from national politics, are significantly less likely to be captured 
by any particular nation or group within a nation.  They are thus more likely to operate 
effectively and garner greater legitimacy both within the region and in the larger 
international community.  Of course, international courts such as the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
have been criticized as political institutions of victors’ justice, but judicial capture by 
elements within a post-conflict government is far more likely and potentially damaging 
than is manipulation by the international community.  Moreover, the existence of a group of 
States-Parties to a regional court would limit the influence of particularly powerful states in 
the region. 
The danger of national criminal courts being captured or manipulated by political 
interests at the expense of fair justice is all too well illustrated by the ongoing attempts to 
create an internationalized criminal court in Cambodia for the trial of the senior leadership 
of the Khmer Rouge.  As I have argued extensively elsewhere, international justice in 
Cambodia has been captured by a sub-group of the political elite that has controlled 
negotiations with the United Nations.73  The Cambodian government divided “precisely 
along the line of the establishment of a tribunal for the Khmer Rogue.  The side of this 
issue on which a member of the Cambodian elite falls depends largely on the individual’s 
position during the time of Khmer Rouge rule.”74  As the UN Group of Experts explains, 
“both of the principal political parties have over the years had strong connections with the 
Khmer Rouge and include former Khmer Rouge among their members, including some 
who might be targets of any investigation into atrocities in the 1970s.”75  As elements of the 
governmental elite have captured the process of the creation of a court, political infighting 
has thwarted the establishment of a tribunal.  Despite a strong domestic public opinion in 
favor of prosecution,76 Prime Minister Hun Sen’s shifting views of the United Nations may 
be indicative of changing alignments within the government.77  To borrow a phrase that 
Jack Snyder used in the context of British imperialism, anti-prosecution elements may have 
“hijack[ed] state policy,” forcing government action to diverge from public preferences in 
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favor of trials.78  The end result of this process of political capture of judicial process has 
been the failure to create an internationalized court in Cambodia after the UN withdrew 
from negotiations with the Cambodian government in February 2002, concluding that “as 
currently envisaged, the Cambodian court would not guarantee independence, impartiality 
and objectivity.”79 
While the difficulty of creating a tribunal in Cambodia highlights the problem of 
political manipulation, even more dangerous consequences may ensue where an already 
existent domestic court is captured by particular political or ethnic factions.  In Kosovo, for 
example, the United Nations created a semi-internationalized court embedded in the 
domestic political context, on which one international judge sat together with two national 
judges.  These tribunals were dangerously susceptible to capture by the Kosovar Albanian 
majority, which could usually outvote the international judge on any particular panel.80  
They therefore quickly lost legitimacy, particularly among the Serb minority, leading to 
eventual United Nations restructuring and reform of the Kosovar judiciary.81  Similar 
dangers of capture and political manipulation exist with respect to semi-internationalized 
courts in East Timor and the Gacacca courts in Rwanda.82 
For a variety of reasons, regional international criminal tribunals are far less subject to 
political capture than are national and semi-internationalized courts.  Whereas national 
courts are embedded in a domestic political context at every stage—from the creation of the 
court to investigation, trial, verdict, and sentencing—once a regional court has been 
established through national political means, its proceedings and operation are more 
insulated from domestic political factors.  While the assembly of states parties to the 
regional court may be influenced by national politics, if there are a sufficiently large 
number of states involved, the domestic politics of any particular member state will be 
sufficiently diluted to prevent capture by particular political, ethnic or religious groups. 
Even where national courts are not, in fact, manipulated by domestic politics, regional 
courts may still offer a greater perception of legitimacy to all interested parties.  In 
transitional states, it is often the case that the government represents a particular ethnic or 
religious group.  A court that appears subject to that group’s control may lose credibility in 
the eyes of the minority.  A regional court is more likely to be seen as separated from 
domestic political strife and more removed from the particular conflicts that may have 
occurred in the territorial state.  As such, a regional court may have more buy-in from 
minority groups and from the international community at large. 
Again, none of the normative arguments above are conclusive support for regional 
criminal law enforcement.  Some factors such as judicial experience and lack of political 
bias argue in favor of supranational enforcement, whereas other factors such as proximity 
to the crimes and reduced costs favor enforcement at the national level.  But in balancing 
these factors the effectiveness, cost, and legitimacy of international criminal justice appear 
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to be maximized through enforcement at the regional level.  At the very least, then, it is 
worth exploring the possibilities of regional criminal law enforcement and the benefits a 
regional system of international criminal law enforcement could offer. 
IV. THEORIZING REGIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Once the normative proposition that regional approaches to international criminal 
justice should, at the least, be considered, positive questions about how to implement 
regional enforcement emerge.  The creation of regional courts to enforce international 
criminal law requires states to delegate jurisdiction over international crimes to a regional 
enforcement body.  Why should states do this, particularly in light of the fact that the ICC 
has already come into existence?  This is a political question: Why would states delegate 
aspects of their sovereign criminal jurisdiction to a regional body?  For regional criminal 
enforcement to be possible, an answer to this question must be found in political science 
theory. 
For such a theory of regional international criminal law enforcement to be useful it 
must do three things.  First, it must situate regional international criminal justice within the 
political science debate over regionalism.  Second, it needs to articulate why states would 
follow a regionalist approach to international justice given the already existent ICC and the 
relatively easy exercise of universal jurisdiction domestically.  And third, it must suggest 
how, from a political science and international relations perspective, the regionalization of 
international criminal justice can be achieved. 
A theory of regional international criminal justice finds its starting point within the 
overall political science literature of regionalization.  Yet, on the surface that literature is 
for regional justice.  Theories of regionalism have largely developed in two waves, the first 
corresponding to the early regionalization in the post-WWII era83 and the second drawing 
from the more recent economic regionalization beginning in the 1980s.84  Theories of first-
wave regionalism were largely limited to the study of Europe, particularly the European 
Coal and Steel Community85 and drew on ideas of shared cultural identity as well as 
functionalist international relations scholarship.  The second wave of theories has looked 
toward economics and functional economic integration, rather than political or cultural ties, 
as the basis for regionalization.86 
Neither theories of first nor second wave regionalism alone can provide a sound 
theoretical basis for regional international criminal law enforcement.  First wave 
regionalism began with the proposition that “members of a common region also share 
cultural, . . . linguistic, or political ties.”87  Such cultural ties, however, while possibly 
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existent in Europe, have been relatively slow to materialize elsewhere and alone cannot 
generate the requisite delegation of criminal jurisdiction from the nation-state to a regional 
court.  First wave regionalization further drew on the literature of functionalism.  First-
wave regionalists used functionalism to show that functional areas of governance could be 
disaggregated and that regional solutions would be more cost effective.88  According to 
early regionalists, cooperation in these areas “would set in motion an ongoing 
process . . . that would lead eventually to political integration.”89  But functionalism alone 
also fails to explain regionalization of international criminal justice.  The exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction is well within the core political functions of the domestic state and 
does not necessarily call for regional solutions.  Thus, there is no functional reason to 
expect regionalism of criminal enforcement. 
Second-wave theories of regionalization appear equally unhelpful in theorizing 
regional international criminal law enforcement.  The economic integration oriented 
second-wave theories90 have focused on trade flows and the need for economic cooperation 
within a globalizing political economy.  While such economic ties may well explain 
regional trade groups, a common regional mechanism for the adjudication of international 
crimes91 is unconnected to economic integration.  Nonetheless, second generation 
regionalism highlights the ways that globalization—of economics or even crime—calls for 
regional solutions to common problems. 
An alternative theoretical approach to regional criminal law enforcement is therefore 
needed.  By drawing on certain elements of both first- and second-wave theories of 
regionalism, a theoretical basis can be found to achieve the normative benefits of 
regionalization discussed in Part III.  Such a theory stems from recent scholarship at the 
intersection of domestic politics and international relations more particularly.  The theory 
starts from the basic proposition of liberal international relations theory that “individuals 
and private groups” are the “fundamental actors in international politics.”92  International 
outcomes, in this case regionalization, depend on the “policy interdependence” among the 
preferences of these domestic actors as mediated through the nation-state.93  Helen Milner 
has articulated such a theory with respect to economic regionalization,94 drawing on Robert 
Putnam’s two-level game analysis, in which the domestic and international levels each 
impose mutual constraints on one another.95  Milner argues that “international negotiations 
to conclude regional co-operative agreements and domestic politics are intertwined” and 
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that domestic politics largely turns on the “electoral concerns” of political leaders and the 
ability to get any agreement ratified by parliament.96 
Regionalism must be understood as a two-step process.  First, states must develop a 
set of preferences in favor of regional outcomes.  Second, they must articulate and 
implement a particular strategy of regionalization to attain those goals.  The first step in 
developing a theory of regional international criminal law enforcement along these lines 
requires, to borrow from Andrew Moravscik, that “government formulate a consistent set 
of national preferences” in favor of regionalization.97  In other words, the preferences of 
particular actors and domestic interests must favor outcomes associated with regional law 
enforcement.  In addition, those actors must succeed at having their preferences reflected in 
government policy.  In many states across numerous regions, the number of interest groups 
in civil society advocating international justice has grown rapidly.98  Where such interests 
are predominately of a regional character, or where they seek to attain the normative 
benefits of regionalization discussed in Part IV above,99 the creation of a “transnational 
regional civil society” united around regionalization may occur.  These interests would, in 
turn, lobby their various governmental institutions or produce electoral benefits for the 
government if it follows a policy of regionalization. 
One potential domestic political calculus that could drive states—democratic and non-
democratic alike—toward a set of national preferences in favor of regionalization is what 
Moravscik calls a political lock-in device.100  As applied to European integration, he argues 
that governments sought regional cooperation or international commitments to lock-in 
domestic policies in the face of “uncertainty about the future.”101  Used to explain the 
origins of an enforceable European Human Rights system, Moravcsik argues that “domestic 
political self-interest of national governments” was the key factor.102  “Establishing an 
international human rights regime is an act of political delegation akin to establishing a 
domestic court or administrative agency . . . .  [It] is a tactic used by governments to ‘lock 
in’ and consolidate democratic institutions, thereby enhancing their credibility and stability 
vis-à-vis nondemocratic political threats.”103  In short, Moravscik claims “governments turn 
to international enforcement when an international commitment effectively enforces the 
policy preferences of a particular government at a particular point in time against future 
domestic political alternatives.”104 
Moravscik’s notion of a lock-in mechanism may also provide a theoretical basis for 
governmental preferences in favor of regionalization of international criminal law 
enforcement.  By delegating sovereignty to a regional criminal enforcement mechanism, 
governments can precommit to “a series of smaller, uncertain decisions” in the future, such 
as whether to prosecute particular international crimes.105  The benefits of such a lock-in 
mechanism, in terms of both legitimacy and policy commitment, may generate a 
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sufficiently strong government preference in favor of regionalization to create or shift 
policy. 
Once a preference for regional enforcement has been established, a second, and 
analytically separate, step in the process of regionalization is the choice by a government of 
a particular strategy of regionalization.  This decision stems from what Moravcsik calls a 
“bargaining over substantive cooperation” among states.106  Such bargaining will only lead 
to regionalization when “the benefits of reducing future political uncertainty outweigh the 
‘sovereignty costs’ of membership” in a regional organization.107  In Milner’s formulation, 
the “central cost [to a regional mechanism] seems to be the loss of a policy instrument.  
International cooperation means that political leaders are prevented from manipulating 
some policy variable that they otherwise could.”108  This is, of course, costly in political 
terms.  States will only cooperate when the loss of that policy instrument is less costly than 
the gains from regionalization.  In particular, a state which commits to enforce international 
criminal law through membership in a regional organization is prevented in the future from 
violating international criminal law and must cooperate in the enforcement of such rules 
vis-à-vis other violators even when such enforcement is not in the state’s national interest 
as then determined.  This is, of course, the primary U.S. argument against ratification of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC.109 
So far, this argument suggests that states may develop policy preferences in favor of 
regionalization, but will only delegate sovereignty to a regional enforcement mechanism 
when the domestic benefits outweigh the sovereignty costs of membership.110  The micro-
foundational benefits of regional enforcement are rooted in the fact that the sovereignty 
costs of membership in a regional organization may be significantly lower than those 
associated with membership in a supranational or global tribunal such as the ICC.  As 
Milner explains, the sovereignty costs of membership in some organizations “may be very 
high—so high that political leaders would not rationally choose cooperation.”111  The 
propensity for cooperation can then be enhanced by decreasing the sovereignty costs of 
membership in a particular organization.  The normative benefits of regionalism discussed 
above suggest that regional international criminal law enforcement institutions offer lower 
sovereignty costs for Member States than do their supranational counterparts. 
The literature of first-wave regionalism is strongly indicative of the lower sovereignty 
costs of membership in a regional enforcement body.  The proto-constructivist theories of 
first-generation regionalism depend on a kind of regional awareness, a “shared perception 
of belonging to a particular community [that] can rest on internal factors, often defined in 
terms of common culture, history, or regional traditions.”112  This approach to regionalism 
sees particular regions as sharing common values, ideals, and practices.  Karl Deutch 
described this regionalism in terms of “security communities,” sharing a sense of common 
identity and common defense.113  Writing about regionalism in terms of “rudimentary value 
sharing,” Ernst Haas defined political integration as the process whereby “political actors in 
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several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and 
political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction 
over the pre-existing national states.”114 
More recently, strong constructivists have stressed the cultural roots of regionalism, 
defining regions as “social constructions”115 and regionalism as “a set of cognitive practices 
shaped by language and political discourse, which through the creation of concepts, 
metaphors, analogies, determine how the region is defined.”116  They point to “cultural and 
political similarities” within NAFTA or to “Asian values” as indicative of cultural and 
social aspects of regionalism.117 
If the shared values inherent in first-generation regionalism and reasserted by modern 
constructivists are correct, then the sovereignty costs of regional enforcement of 
international criminal law may be far lower than those associated with supranational 
enforcement mechanisms.  If a regional court shares the values of its Member States and 
enforces international criminal law within the scope of that value set, then members should 
have less to fear from such an organization.  Within a regional framework, the potential 
range of perceived “foreign” invasive action by a criminal court would be reduced, thus 
increasing domestic demand for regionalization and easing the government’s decision to 
delegate sovereignty. 
The lower sovereignty cost of regional arrangements can also be considered 
empirically, based on the absolute numbers of states involved.  In a supranational 
enforcement body such as the ICC, the sheer number of members of the assembly of states 
parties (in the future, possibly as many as 200 in the case of the ICC) limits the influence of 
any particular state on issues referred to the assembly, such as amendments to the elements 
of crimes or the selection of judges.118  Whereas, within the framework of a regional 
mechanism, the smaller number of states-parties increases the influence of any particular 
state, thereby reducing the sovereignty costs of membership.  Likewise, the reduction in the 
number of states parties increases the likelihood that a particular state’s nominees for 
judges or will be chosen, again reducing the sovereignty costs of membership. 
The neo-functionalist arguments of second-generation regionalism and European 
integration, upon which much of the above argument rests, further suggest that 
opportunities for regional criminal law enforcement can be enhanced if regional courts 
were also delegated jurisdiction over region-specific issues.  As Andrew Hurrell argues, 
regional mechanisms are more likely to arise where they “solve common problems, 
especially problems arising from increased levels of regional interdependence.”119  Anne-
Marie Slaughter and Walter Mattli explain the development of the European Court of 
Justice based on this neo-functionalist approach, arguing “that the Court’s success in 
constructing an effective Community legal system was best explained in neofunctionalist 
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terms.”120  They find that “individuals . . . who could point to a provision in the Community 
treaties . . . that supported a particular activity they wished to undertake . . . were able to 
invoke Community law.”121  While in international criminal law individuals cannot bring 
cases, independent prosecutors can.  The “self-interested private actors” essential to the 
neo-functionalist argument are still part of the international criminal system, even if in a 
different form.122  If this argument is correct, increasing the number of possible issues of 
regional relevance that prosecutors can pursue should increase the robustness of regional 
courts.  As most regional arrangements are related to economic cooperation and preferential 
trade arrangements, vesting regional international criminal courts with jurisdiction over 
certain economic crimes, which are of concern to Member States but not sufficiently 
redressed by domestic tribunals, would enhance the likelihood of the emergence of regional 
courts. 
While the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC do not have jurisdiction over such crimes and such 
crimes are not subject to universal jurisdiction, there is nothing to prevent states from 
delegating jurisdiction over economic crimes to a regional court, subject to the member 
states’ particular domestic laws.  Vesting regional courts with such jurisdiction could well 
enhance the political and electoral benefits of regional courts without significantly 
increasing the sovereignty costs of membership, thereby enhancing their value and 
likelihood of creation. 
What emerges then is a theoretical explanation for a move toward the regionalization 
of international criminal law enforcement that explains how and why states would choose 
regional rather than supranational enforcement mechanisms.  Based on micro-foundational 
international relations analysis, it asserts that domestic political calculations lead states to 
develop policy preferences in favor of regionalization.  States then choose to delegate 
sovereignty to a regional enforcement mechanism when these benefits of regionalization 
outweigh the sovereignty costs of membership in a regional court. 
V. IMPLEMENTING REGIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Having provided a theoretical account of why states would choose regional 
enforcement of international criminal law, it is necessary to examine how they could do so.  
What are the specific pathways to regionalization currently available?  There are four 
potential means to regionalizing the enforcement of international criminal law, ranging 
from hard to soft regionalism.  These include: (1) the creation of specialized regional 
criminal courts; (2) the ICC sitting regionally; (3) a preference in the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction for prosecution by a state within the region in which the crime occurred, and 
(4) semi-internationalized criminal courts drawing on judges and precedents from within 
the region.  This section considers in detail the ways that each of these four options could 
be pursued, exploring the possibilities from the perspective of international law and the 
challenges of implementation from the perspective of political science. 
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A. Regional Criminal Courts 
The strongest possible form of regionalization of international criminal justice would 
be the creation of truly regional international criminal courts.  Such courts would in theory 
follow the model of the ICC, yet would have their territorial jurisdiction limited to the 
particular region in which they sit and draw upon judges from that region.  Like the ICC, 
such courts would need to be established by the potential regional member states through 
treaty.  However, such a treaty would be far easier to negotiate as fewer member states 
would be involved and the potential for greater consensus may exist within the region.  
Thus, a regional criminal court could avoid much of the discord that characterized the 
negotiation of the Rome Statute of the ICC.123 
In many ways, the ICTY has become a regional criminal court for the Balkans as it 
has jurisdiction over international crimes, which occur on the entire territory of the former 
Yugoslavia, now including Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Croatia.124  Yet, while the 
ICTY draws its judges and staff from all UN member and observer states and follows a 
kind of universal procedure, a truly regional criminal court would presumably include 
judges only from the particular region and allow regional procedural variation. 
While it might at first seem to be reinventing the wheel to create regional criminal 
courts now that the ICC statute has come into force,125 the normative appeal of 
regionalization discussed in Part III and the theoretical explanation for regionalization 
considered in Part IV, may make the effort worthwhile.  Moreover, many parts of the world 
already have strong regional mechanisms in place, within which regional criminal courts 
could be situated.  For example, Europe already has an extremely robust regional court 
system,126 including both the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR).  An amendment to the Treaty of European Union127 or the Statute 
of the European Court of Human Rights,128 for example, could vest the ECJ and the ECHR 
with jurisdiction over international crimes committed in the region or by Member-State 
nationals.129  Alternatively, an entirely new regional court with jurisdiction over individuals 
could be established.  Likewise, the Organization of American States has a pre-existing 
legal structure, including the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.130  While the purpose 
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of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the “application and interpretation of the 
American Convention on Human Rights” to states131 and its statute does not provide for 
individual criminal responsibility, a new treaty or protocol could extend its jurisdiction to 
include individual criminal responsibility. 
Alternatively, in regions without strong pre-existing judicial mechanisms, entirely 
new regional courts could be created.  South Africa provides an excellent example.  In Sub-
Saharan Africa there are few strong regional organizations but numerous international 
crimes have been committed.132  An entirely new regional tribunal would therefore be 
necessary.  South Africa could take the lead in this effort, furthering its regionalist project 
to “bind the region together under South African leadership.”133  Such a regional 
international criminal court seated in South Africa would further Thabo Mbeki’s goal of 
bringing “to an end the practices as a result of which many throughout the world have the 
view that as Africans, we are incapable of establishing and maintaining systems of good 
governance” and could “encourage all other countries on our continent to move in the same 
direction . . . .”134  The Asian region, whether defined narrowly or broadly, would likewise 
require a ground-up effort if strong regional criminal courts are to be created. 
Admittedly, the creation of entirely new judicial mechanisms or even the vesting of 
existing regional courts with individual criminal jurisdiction would not be either a quick or 
easy task.  While this option has been presented here to provide a complete range of 
options, such strong regionalization may not be necessary to achieve the normative benefits 
discussed above.  Although there may be particular benefits associated with such a strong 
form of regional international criminal justice, similar goals can be achieved through the 
softer, more easily implemented alternatives considered next. 
B. The International Criminal Court Sitting Regionally 
The ICC Statute already provides for the possibility of the Court sitting regionally.  
While the ICC is primarily a supranational enforcement mechanism, with its seat in The 
Hague—far removed from most of the cases it is likely to hear—Article 3 of the Rome 
Statute envisions a regional seat in certain circumstances.  Pursuant to Article 3, “[t]he seat 
of the Court shall be established at The Hague in the Netherlands,” but “[t]he Court may sit 
elsewhere, whenever it considers it desirable.”135 
The Rome Statute thus explicitly authorizes sessions outside of The Hague and leaves 
a great deal of leeway to the Court to determine when it should do so.  The Rome Statute 
provides little guidance as to when the Court should sit regionally, only observing that the 
court should do so when it “considers it desirable.”136  According to the traveaux 
preparatoires, the basic considerations for the court in determining whether to sit outside of 
The Hague are the practicality of such arrangements and whether it is in the interests of 
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justice to do so.137  Pursuant to Article 38(3)(a) of the Statute, decisions regarding the seat 
of the court in a particular case and the logistical arrangements necessary are the 
responsibility of the Presidency of the Court.  Thus, a decision of the President of the Court 
that it is normatively preferable and logistically possible to sit regionally would be 
sufficient to allow the Court to sit out of The Hague, presumably in the region where the 
crimes occurred.  From a legal perspective then, the possibility of the ICC sitting in a 
regional context is both possible and easy to achieve without structural changes. 
From a logistical standpoint, the possibility of the ICC sitting regionally is also 
realizeable.  First, the Court would need to negotiate with a state in the region to sit for at 
least the purposes of obtaining evidence and conducting the trial in that state.  A temporary 
headquarters agreement might need to be negotiated with the temporary host state to ensure 
the safety and sanctity of UN personnel during the proceedings.138  Such agreements “have 
evolved into a fairly standardized format” and are unlikely to present serious difficulties.139  
Second, the ICC would need to identify and secure facilities for the trial.  National facilities 
of a state in the region could be borrowed or rented by the Court as needed.  As the Court 
would bring its own legitimacy and independence to the region, it could probably utilize 
host state facilities without significant claims of bias and improper influence.  
Alternatively, the Court could utilize existing UN facilities in the region—such as the court 
rooms of the ICTR in Arusha.  The use by the U.K. government of Camp Zeist in the 
Netherlands for the Lockerbie trial is illustrative of this possibility.140 
While one of the leading commentaries on the Rome Statute is somewhat skeptical of 
the ICC sitting out of The Hague, there are clear benefits to this arrangement.  In the 2002 
Commentary, Adriaan Bos observes: “[G]reater risks may be involved in sittings outside 
the Host State.  Proximity of the trial to the place where the crime was allegedly committed 
may cast a shadow over the proceedings.  It can raise questions concerning the respect for 
the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial or it may create unacceptable security 
risks . . . .”141  Nonetheless, he acknowledges conducting the “trial closer to the scene of the 
alleged crime” may “facilitate the attendance of witnesses and the production of 
evidence.”142  If the ICC Presidency were to make the decision to sit regionally, the 
concerns Bos raises could largely be avoided as the Court would still have the distance 
from the actual site of the crime as well as the international legitimacy to ensure security 
and impartiality.  As the ICC begins operations it should give strong consideration to this 
possibility of a regional seat in appropriate cases. 
C. Regional Preference for the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction 
A third means of moving enforcement of international criminal law from the 
supranational to the regional level, completely independent of the ICC, is through the 
regional exercise of universal jurisdiction.  Universal jurisdiction delegates authority from 
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the international system to states to prosecute crimes in their domestic courts committed by 
non-nationals extraterritorially.143  While universal jurisdiction can be exercised with 
respect to serious international crimes by any state that has delegated to its courts the 
jurisdiction to hear such cases, regionalization can be achieved by granting a jurisdictional 
preference to states within the region in which the crime occurred.  There are states in all 
regions of the world with the domestic legislation to exercise universal jurisdiction.  More 
than 120 states have adopted legislation to prosecute war crimes under the universality 
principle,144 and at least ninety-five have adopted legislation with respect to crimes against 
humanity.145  Wherever international crimes occur, there are states within the region 
capable of prosecution under the universality principle. 
Presently there are no generally observed rules for resolving jurisdictional conflicts 
with respect to the exercise of universal jurisdiction.  As any state with the requisite 
domestic laws can prosecute international crimes under universal jurisdiction, jurisdictional 
conflicts can arise.  Thus, when Augusto Pinochet was arrested in the United Kingdom in 
1999, there was no clear hierarchy of jurisdiction to determine by which of a number of 
states seeking extradition he should be prosecuted.  The Princeton Principles on Universal 
Jurisdiction, an attempt by leading scholars in international law to develop a set of guiding 
principles for the exercise of universal jurisdiction, sought to resolve this tension by 
providing a set of criteria for determining priority in the exercise of jurisdiction.  The 
Princeton Principles direct states to resolve jurisdictional conflicts based on 
an aggregate balance of . . . (a) multilateral or bilateral treaty obligations; (b) the 
place of commission of the crime; (c) the nationality connection of the alleged 
perpetrator to the requesting state; (d) the nationality connection of the victim to 
the requesting state; (e) any other connection between the requesting state and 
the alleged perpetrator, the crime, or the victim; (f) the likelihood, good faith, 
and effectiveness of the prosecution in the requesting state; (g) the fairness and 
impartiality of the proceedings in the requesting state; (h) convenience to the 
parties and witnesses, as well as the availability of evidence in the requesting 
state; and (i) the interests of justice.”146  The Commentaries make clear that this 
list “is not intended to be exhaustive,” but rather is designed “to provide states 
with guidelines for the resolution of conflicts.147 
A complex balancing test thus arises which does not offer a clear solution to 
jurisdictional conflicts. 
The Principles include a tacit acknowledgement of the importance of regionalism, 
noting the priority of the territorial state and specifically mentioning the “convenience to 
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the parties and witnesses, as well as the availability of evidence” as key factors to 
consider.148  A more explicit preference for the exercise of universal jurisdiction by states 
within the region could be accomplished merely by state practice and jurisdictional restraint 
by non-regional states. 
Of course, regionalization of universal jurisdiction would not resolve all jurisdictional 
conflicts nor should it be the sole determinant for the exercise of universal jurisdiction.  If 
two states within the region where the crime occurred both seek to exercise universal 
jurisdiction, the other factors included in the Princeton Principles would need to be 
considered.  Moreover, where the requesting state within the region lacks “good faith” and 
“effectiveness”149 or is unable to “observe international due process norms,”150 
jurisdictional preference should not be granted to it.  Likewise, where the regional exercise 
of universal jurisdiction would produce dangerous political repercussions, such as India 
exercising universal jurisdiction against a Pakistani official, other options should be 
considered.  Thus, regionalization of universal jurisdiction must be considered in the 
context of regional politics and the domestic institutions and intent of the requesting state. 
Regionalization of international criminal law through a regional preference in the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction, like the ICC sitting regionally, would be relatively easy to 
achieve.  States such as Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany are already active in the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction.151  Thus, war crimes in say Kosovo could be prosecuted 
regionally in the national courts of Belgium or Switzerland.  While the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction has to date largely been a European phenomenon,152 it is not limited thereto.  
International crimes committed in Congo or Rwanda could be prosecuted in South Africa 
while those in Sierra Leone could be heard in Ghana, for example.  The only necessary 
prerequisites for regionalization through universal jurisdiction are for states in regions other 
than Europe to demonstrate the political willingness to exercise universal jurisdiction and 
the emergence of a state practice whereby jurisdictional preference is granted to states 
within the region.153 
D. Specialized Domestic Courts with Regional Judges 
A fourth opportunity for regionalization is through specialized domestic courts in 
post-conflict situations drawing on resources and personnel from within the region.  A 
significant development in the enforcement of international criminal law is the growing 
number of specialized domestic or semi-internationalized courts adjudicating cases of 
international crimes.154  Such courts are most often created in post-conflict transitional 
situations in which a fully internationalized tribunal is impracticable, yet the domestic 
judiciary is unable to deal with the complexity and number of outstanding cases.  These 
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courts are currently sitting in East Timor,155 Kosovo,156 and Sierra Leone157 and have been 
proposed in Cambodia.158  In both East Timor and Sierra Leone, the courts are effectively 
grafted onto the domestic judiciary, applying international criminal law within the overall 
structure of the domestic courts.  Likewise, in both countries, the judicial panels consist of 
local and international judges sitting together on a mixed panel.159 
As these courts are effectively part of the national judicial system, it may seem 
anomalous to talk of regionalization.  Yet, these semi-internationalized courts include 
international judges, effectively borrowed from other legal systems.  Regionalization, thus, 
can be achieved through the selection of international judges who sit in these courts.  The 
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone explicitly provides for such 
regionalization.  It specifies that “[t]hree judges shall serve in the Trial Chamber where one 
shall be appointed by the Government of Sierra Leone and two judges appointed by the 
Secretary-General, upon nominations forwarded by States, and in particular the member 
States of the Economic Community of West African States and the Commonwealth, at the 
invitation of the Secretary-General.”160  The actual selection of judges has reflected this 
preference for nominees from the Economic Community of West African States and the 
Commonwealth.  Judges hail from Cameroon, Nigeria, and The Gambia, as well as Sierra 
Leone and the United Kingdom.161  Even where such regionalization is not specifically 
provided for, it can be achieved easily through the selection of judges and personnel.  In 
East Timor, for example, there are no formal guidelines for determining the national origin 
of judges.162  To date, judges have come from Portugal, Cape Verde, East Timor163 as well 
as Burundi.  During the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, judges were 
recruited through the United Nations, which sought applications directly from national 
judges and nominations from Member States.164  To regionalize these courts, the particular 
court administration and the United Nations would simply need to select judges from 
within the region where the courts sit and the crimes occurred, rather than from a general 
international pool. 
Regionalization has been explicitly considered by the Cambodian Government for the 
operation of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Trial of the 
Senior Leadership of the Khmer Rouge.  If Cambodia and the United Nations are unable to 
reach an agreement on the creation of these courts through UN mechanisms, the 
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Cambodian government has suggested a strategy to work around the United Nations and 
draw judges directly from neighbouring states.  The government of India, for example, has 
explicitly offered to provide a judge to sit on such a tribunal.165 
Similarly, a kind of regionalization is being considered for the trial of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity committed by Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq.  On April 8, 
2003, U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes Pierre Prosper and W. Hays Parks, Special 
Assistant to the Army’s Judge Advocate General, announced plans for crimes against 
humanity trials in special Iraqi courts in “what Mr. Prosper called ‘an Iraqi-led process that 
will bring justice for the years of abuses.’”166  M. Cheriff Bassiouni has developed a plan 
for a mixed tribunal, similar to those in Sierra Leone and East Timor, “that employs Iraqi 
judges along with experienced jurors from other Arab nations.”167  Similarly, the author 
along with co-author Anne-Marie Slaughter have called for the creation of “mixed panels 
of Iraqi and international judges applying both domestic and international law.”168  By 
drawing on international judges from Arab countries with distinguished judiciaries such as 
Egypt these proposed courts could enhance their legitimacy both within Iraq and the 
international community. 
While regionalizaiton through the creation of regional criminal courts might have 
been a preferable option prior to the creation of the ICC, in the current context, the 
establishment of such courts is probably an unnecessary duplication.  Nonetheless, many of 
the normative benefits of regionalization can be achieved through relatively simple options 
such as the ICC sitting regionally, a regional preference in the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction, and the regionalization of semi-internationalized tribunals. 
VI. THE EFFECTS OF REGIONAL ENFORCEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
TWO VARIANTS 
A move toward regional enforcement as part of a larger system of international 
criminal law consisting of national, regional, and supranational enforcement tribunals may 
also have an important effect on substantive international law.  Two possible variants of 
this effect seem most likely.  One possibility would be a fragmentation of international 
criminal law, whereby different substantive rules emerge in different regions.  A second 
and preferable possibility is differentiation of procedural law within a relatively unified 
substantive jurisprudence.  This section explores these two possible effects of regional 
enforcement of international criminal law, arguing that a fragmentation of substantive 
international criminal law is a highly unlikely, though dangerous possibility.  Procedural 
differentiation with a universal system, however, would be normatively beneficial and is far 
more likely. 
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A. Fragmentation of International Criminal Law 
As the number of tribunals independently adjudicating similar legal issues, without 
any hierarchical review procedures, increases, so too does the possibility for variations in 
the substance of international law.  Indicative of such variations are splits in the various 
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals on key legal issues that would be quite dangerous if it were 
not for the writ of certiori to the United States Supreme Court through which some degree 
of uniformity can be achieved.  Likewise, disagreements between the French Council d’Etat 
(the high court for administrative matters), the Cour de Cassation (the high court of general 
jurisdiction), and the Counseil Constitutionnel (which has, among other duties, the right of 
constitutional review of treaties) have proved challenging with respect to the direct 
application of European Community law in France.169 
While both the U.S. and French systems have developed mechanisms to resolve such 
disputes, the emergent system of international criminal law has neither a high court of 
review nor a requirement of stare decisis.  Without a high court, the decisions of any 
regional court—or at least of that court’s own appellate body—would be binding and not 
subject to review for uniformity.  Without a system of stare decisis, previously decided 
cases would not be binding, and regional courts would not be under any obligation to 
follow the decisions of other tribunals.  Jonathan Charney explains the danger: “Significant 
variations in general international law . . . could undermine the perceived uniformity and 
universality of international law . . . .  As a result, the increased multiplicity of international 
dispute settlement forums may present particular difficulties for the international legal 
system.”170 
Even a slight variation in substantive rules of international criminal law could prove 
extremely damaging.  Thomas Buergenthal, a judge on the International Court of Justice, 
has observed that “the proliferation of international tribunals can . . . have adverse 
consequences . . . .”171  Take, for example, the law of crimes against humanity.  The 
standard definition of crimes against humanity, as articulated by the ICTR, is any of a series 
of enumerated acts including murder conducted against a civilian population as part of a 
wide-spread and systematic attack.172  The core elements of the crime are (1) a widespread 
and systematic attack on (2) a civilian population.173  If a regional court were to change the 
definition of widespread or systematic even slightly, great variation in what constitutes a 
crime against humanity could occur.  For example, a system might emerge in which crimes 
against humanity in Africa require a nexus to an international conflict—thereby excluding 
from the definition many crimes against humanity committed in internal conflicts, 
particularly frequent in Africa.  A European definition might not require this nexus, thereby 
expanding the scope of the crime.  Variation in the substantive elements of crimes could 
emerge such that international crimes have distinct regional definitions. 
Such a development would be dangerous for a number of reasons.  First, international 
crimes that are supposedly universal in nature would lose their sense of universality and 
global condemnation as they come to have regional variation.  Second, loopholes might be 
created whereby perpetrators of international crimes could avoid conviction by relying on 
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regional variation in the definitions of crimes.  Third, judges in certain regions could 
possibly reshape international criminal law to allow particular individuals to avoid 
conviction.  Finally, the legitimacy of international criminal law could be fundamentally 
threatened.  Charney observes: “To the extent that international tribunals announce 
different views on rules of general international law, the legitimacy of those rules in this 
fragile community may be placed at risk.”174 
To evaluate regional criminal law enforcement, we must assess whether the threat of 
fragmentation of substantive international law is real.  It is here argued that the threat is 
minimal at most.  Evidence from the proliferation of general international law tribunals and 
the nature of international criminal law itself suggest that serious fragmentation of 
substantive international criminal law is highly unlikely. 
In the past few decades, the number of tribunals adjudicating questions of general 
international law has greatly increased, now including the ICJ, the WTO, the ECJ, and a 
countless array of international arbitral bodies.  Jonathan Charney has conducted an 
exhaustive study to determine whether this proliferation of such tribunals has undermined 
the viability and legitimacy of the international legal system.  Considering the jurisprudence 
of more than ten international tribunals175 across eight substantive areas, such as sources of 
law, the law of state responsibility, and the law of exhaustion of domestic remedies, 
Charney found remarkably little difference in substantive international law.  In fact, he 
found the various tribunals “share a coherent understanding of that law.”176  He concludes: 
“[T]he variations among tribunals deciding questions of international law are not so 
significant that they challenge its coherence and legitimacy as a system of law.”177 
Just as the proliferation of international tribunals generally has not threatened the 
international legal system through wide substantive variation, the nature of international 
criminal law itself suggests that such fragmentation is unlikely.  Currently international 
criminal law is being enforced and applied by a variety of tribunals including the ICTY, the 
ITCR, various national courts exercising universal jurisdiction, as well as specialized semi-
internationalized courts in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and, soon, Sierra Leone.  While 
there is no court of general appellate jurisdiction for international criminal law, a great deal 
of deference has been accorded to the decisions of the ICTY and a similar deference to the 
decisions of the ICC can be expected.  Given the limited experience most judges have in 
international criminal law, the decisions of the ICTY have been given particular weight.  In 
East Timor for example, Judge Sylver Ntukamazina “rel[ies] frequently on the ICTY and 
ICTR.”178  Likewise, Stuart Alford, one of the international prosecutors in East Timor, 
consults the Rome Statute, the ICC Preparatory Commission materials, and the “judgments 
of the two ad hoc tribunals.”179  This deference to the ICTY has effectively created a system 
whereby ICTY decisions have a quasi-stare decisis effect, thus helping to ensure uniformity 
of the international legal system.  In an analysis of the jurisprudence of crimes against 
humanity in the ICTY and other international tribunals, Guenael Mettraux observes: 
“Whereas national courts sometimes relied upon distinctively domestic definitions of 
[crimes against humanity,] . . . [b]y vesting the Tribunals with the binding authority of 
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customary law, the Secretary General, and through him the Security Council, guaranteed 
the enduring impact of the Tribunals’ decisions.  This approach also afforded a welcome 
degree of jurisprudential uniformity . . . .”180 
This is not to say that a proliferation of international criminal law enforcement 
mechanisms, particularly at the regional level, will not lead to some variation in 
jurisprudence.  However, to borrow again from John Charney, the appropriate question is 
“whether, despite minor differences, are the cases and the tribunals engaged in the same 
dialectic and do they render decisions that are relatively compatible.”181  The preliminary 
answer with respect to international criminal law is “yes,” and that the creation of 
additional tribunals at the regional level will not threaten this coherence and compatibility.  
In fact, some minor variation in jurisprudence may in fact be a positive development to the 
extent that it allows “a degree of experimentation and exploration.”182  Minor 
experimentation in international law may well help “find the best rule to serve the 
international community as a whole.”183  This is the same concept inherent in Michael Dorf 
and Charles Sabel’s argument for “democratic experimentalism.”184  Of course, the line 
between minor experimentation and serious fragmentation is a thin one, but it is one that 
has been successful in general international law and can likely succeed in international 
criminal law as well.185 
B. Procedural Differentiation Within a Universal System 
A second, and far more likely, outcome of regionalization of international criminal 
law enforcement is the emergence of procedural differentiation between regions within the 
context of a universal substantive law.  Marked procedural differences in criminal law exist 
between domestic legal systems.  The distinctions between a common law adversarial 
system and a civil law inquisitorial system, for example, are myriad.  Greater still are the 
differences between sharia justice in the Islamic world and, say, traditional justice under the 
Rwandan Gacaca laws.  Blending common law and civil law traditions has long been a 
challenge of supranational criminal law enforcement.  Daryl Mundis has observed a 
“discernible shift in the trial practice of the [ICTY from] . . . common law trials . . . in the 
direction of the civil law approach.”186  This tension has driven much of the reform of the 
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence187 and has been particularly frustrating to many 
ICTY judges.188 
Regionalization of international criminal law enforcement would allow regional 
variation in the procedure, structure, and format of international tribunals.  A European 
Court—despite possible U.K. resistance—could take a more civil law-oriented approach, 
with investigating judges, written affidavits,189 and an active bench.  A North American 
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court might prefer a more common law-oriented approach.  Similarly, variation in other 
procedural elements would be possible in an African or Asian court, which might better 
reflect the traditions and value sets of such nations.  For example, differences in the 
qualifications for judges, the composition of the bench, or the amount of evidence to be 
heard are possible through regionalization.  National preferences on these often decisive 
issues could be better accommodated by regional courts which would have a narrower 
range of values and views to accommodate.190  As such, procedural variation may be a 
significant benefit to international justice, increasing the willingness of states to cooperate 
with courts and enhancing the perceived legitimacy of such courts within affected 
communities.  Such procedural differences might well drive the lower sovereignty costs of 
membership in a regional criminal court.191 
A second reason for regional differentiation might be caused by financial resources 
constraints.  For example, a regional court in Africa may well have fewer resources 
available or decide to allocate its available resources over a larger number of cases than 
might a better funded court in Europe with fewer cases to hear.  Such variation is far from 
ideal and would, admittedly, lead to a different quality of justice rendered in each court.  
While in a perfect world variation based on financial resources would not be necessary, 
given the limited resources available in many regions where international crimes are 
particularly frequent and the relative unwillingness of donor states to contribute 
significantly to judicial reconstruction, such variation may sadly be unavoidable. 
It may be far better to confront these financial realities head-on, allowing courts to 
respond to their financial circumstances in the way they deem most effective, while 
simultaneously encouraging donor aid and support, rather than hiding the fact that judicial 
resources are not equally well distributed around the globe.  Whatever level of judicial 
assistance from the developed world, the ICTR cannot try the more than 100,000 suspects 
in Rwanda.  In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, whereby decisions are rooted 
as the lowest possible level at which “objectives can adequately be achieved,”192 the hard 
choice between complex procedural trials for a few and impunity for the rest or more 
flexible procedure for all may be best left to the region to make.193  Instead of forcing 
courts to follow, say, the comparatively expensive Anglo-American procedure in the face 
of massive resource constraints, allowing them the flexibility to allocate available resources 
more efficiently through, say, the Rwandan Gacaca, might enhance the overall justice 
process. 
This procedural differentiation would occur within a universal context, both in terms 
of substantive law and core procedural rights.  As discussed above, it seems most likely that 
the basic substantive rules of international criminal law would continue to apply in all 
regions with some degree of uniformity.  Likewise, procedural variation would be limited 
by core universal guarantees of rights.  The right to a free and fair trial is recognized by all 
major political, social, religious, and cultural systems.  The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights states that everyone “is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing 
by an independent and impartial tribunal.”194  Even in times of war, Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions requires that anyone accused of a crime be afforded “all the 
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judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”195  The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,196 the Inter-American Convention on 
Human Rights,197 the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,198 the African Charter 
on Human and People’s Rights,199 and the European Human Rights Convention200 all 
contain similar guarantees of fair judicial process.  What emerges from these numerous 
international instruments are five core principles of international due process: the 
presumption of innocence;201 the right to a speedy trial;202 the right to counsel of choice;203 
the right to confront evidence and witnesses in a public forum;204 and the right to an 
appeal.205 
In practice at least, any regional court, wherever it may sit, would thus be bound by 
these core guarantees of fair process.  While regions would have to borrow from the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, a “margin of appreciation” within which 
their particular values and preferences could be accommodated, they would be constrained 
by core universal guarantees.206  Procedural differentiation among regional courts within a 
universal system would thus reflect what Anthony Appiah refers to as “universalistic 
cosmopolitanism: a celebration of difference that remains committed to the existence of 
universal standards.”207  States and regions would be allowed to follow their own 
preferences and values to a limited degree, while remaining committed to and part of a 
larger universal system of international criminal law. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As international criminal law matures and new means for its enforcement are sought, 
it is at the very least worth exploring the opportunities of regional enforcement.  While by 
no means a panacea, regionalization does offer important benefits.  As contrasted with 
supranational enforcement mechanisms, regional enforcement may be significantly less 
expensive, have greater legitimacy within affected communities, contribute to restorative 
justice, engage domestic courts in reconstructive efforts, and facilitate deeper commitments 
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by states that face lower sovereignty costs of membership.  As compared to domestic 
enforcement, regional tribunals may have greater resources, be less susceptible to political 
capture, and carry greater legitimacy within the international community. 
This paper is not a call for the exclusive exercise of regional criminal justice nor even 
necessarily for the creation of regional criminal courts.  Rather, it has been argued that, for 
a variety of reasons, it is important to consider regional enforcement options within the 
larger context of an emerging system of international criminal justice.208  Such a system 
would include the ICC, the exercise of universal jurisdiction by non-territorial states, and 
special semi-internationalized courts as well as regional mechanisms of enforcement.  
Moreover, many of these already existent enforcement options provide room for 
regionalization, which has to date been under-explored.  At the least, then, this paper 
should be read as a call to consider these regional options—both in terms of feasibility and 
normative benefit.  In so doing, the overall legitimacy, effectiveness, and future prospects 
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